-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Hash: SHA1



=============================================================================

CERT(sm) Advisory CA-97.06

Original issue date: February 6, 1997

Last Revised: February 12, 1998

              Added vendor information for NCR Corporation



              November 14, 1997

              Added vendor information for Data General Corporation.



              A complete revision history is at the end of this file.





Topic: Vulnerability in rlogin/term

- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------



The CERT Coordination Center has received reports of a vulnerability in many

implementations of the rlogin program, including eklogin and klogin. By

exploiting this vulnerability, users with access to an account on the system

can cause a buffer overflow and execute arbitrary programs as root.



The CERT/CC staff recommends installing a vendor patch for this problem

(Sec. III.A). Until you can do so, we urge you to turn off rlogin or replace

it with a wrapper (see Sec. III.B.2).



We will update this advisory as we receive additional information.

Please check advisory files regularly for updates that relate to your site.



- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------



I.   Description



     The rlogin program provided by many UNIX systems, as well as some non-UNIX

     systems, is described in RFC 1282. Here is an excerpt from that RFC that

     describes its elemental functionality:



        "The rlogin facility provides a remote-echoed, locally flow-

         controlled virtual terminal with proper flushing of output.

         It is widely used between Unix hosts because it provides

         transport of more of the Unix terminal environment semantics

         than does the Telnet protocol, and because on many Unix hosts

         it can be configured not to require user entry of passwords

         when connections originate from trusted hosts."



     The key point from this description is that the rlogin program passes

     the terminal type description from the local host to the remote host.

     This functionality allows terminal-aware programs such as full-screen

     text editors to operate properly across a computer-to-computer

     connection created with rlogin.



     To do this, the rlogin program uses the current terminal definition as

     identified by the TERM environment variable. The protocol described in

     RFC 1282 explains how this terminal information is transferred from the

     local machine where the rlogin client program is running to the remote

     machine where service is sought.



     Unfortunately, many implementations of the rlogin program contain a

     defect whereby the value of the TERM environment variable is copied to

     an internal buffer without due care. The buffer holding the copied value

     of TERM can be overflowed. In some implementations, the buffer is a local

     variable, meaning that the subroutine call stack can be overwritten and

     arbitrary code executed. The executed code is under the control of the

     user running the rlogin program.



     In addition, the rlogin program is set-user-id root. rlogin requires

     these increased privileges so it can allocate a port in the required

     range, as described in the in.rlogind (or rlogind) manual page:



         "The server checks the client's source port. If the port is not

          in the range 0-1023, the server aborts the connection."



     In summary, rlogin is a set-user-id root program that in many

     implementations contains a programming defect whereby an internal buffer

     can be overflowed and arbitrary code can be executed as root.



II.  Impact



     Users can become root if they have access to an account on the system.



III. Solution



     Install a patch from your vendor if one is available (Section A).

     Until you can take one of those actions, we recommend applying the

     workaround described in Section B.



     A.  Obtain and install a patch for this problem.



         Below is a list of vendors who have provided information about

         rlogin. Details are in Appendix A of this advisory; we will update

         the appendix as we receive more information. If your vendor's name is

         not on this list, the CERT/CC did not hear from that vendor. Please

         contact your vendor directly.



              Berkeley Software Design, Inc. (BSDI)

              Cray Research - A Silicon Graphics Company

              Cygnus Solutions (formerly Cygnus Support)

              Data General Corporation

              Digital Equipment Corporation

              FreeBSD, Inc.

              Hewlett-Packard Corporation

              IBM Corporation

              Linux Systems

              NCR Corporation

              NEC Corporation

              NetBSD

              NeXT Software, Inc.

              The Open Group

              The Santa Cruz Operation (SCO)

              Sun Microsystems, Inc.



     B.  Until you are able to install the appropriate patch, we recommend

         one of the following workarounds:



         1. Turn off rlogin.

            If your user community does not use rlogin, turn it off.

            As root, do the following:



                % chmod 0 /usr/bin/rlogin



            You may find the rlogin program in some other directory on

            your system. Example directories are: /bin, /usr/bin, /usr/ucb.



            Note: On some systems, rlogin is provided in different forms

            that do additional work. Examples are eklogin (kerberos

            authentication plus encryption of the data stream) and klogin

            (kerberos authentication only). These, too, need to be turned

            off.



         2. Replace the rlogin program with a wrapper.

            We have written a prototype wrapper that is available at



          URL http://info.cert.org/pub/tools/rlogin_wrapper/rlogin_wrapper.c



            The PGP signature for this file is available at



          URL http://info.cert.org/pub/tools/rlogin_wrapper/rlogin_wrapper.c.asc



            To verify that this file is correct, fetch both the

            rlogin_wrapper.c and rlogin_wrapper.c.asc files and check the

            signature with pgp as in



               % pgp rlogin_wrapper.c.asc rlogin_wrapper.c



            Notes:

               * You may have to change this program to get it to compile and

                  work correctly on your system.



               * If you have different forms of rlogin, as noted in the

                  previous section, then you will need to replace those forms

                  with the wrapper as well.



...........................................................................



Appendix A - Vendor Information



Below is a list of the vendors who have provided information for this

advisory. We will update this appendix as we receive additional information.

If you do not see your vendor's name, the CERT/CC did not hear from that

vendor. Please contact the vendor directly.





Berkeley Software Design, Inc. (BSDI)

====================================

        Unpatched BSD/OS 2.1 systems are vulnerable to this problem.  A patch

        was issued that resolved this problem in August 1996.  The patch is

        available from the  mail server or via anonymous ftp

        at:



             http://ftp.bsdi.com/bsdi/patches/patches-2.1/U210-021





Cray Research - A Silicon Graphics Company

==========================================

        This problem has been corrected in all currently supported versions

        of Unicos.





Cygnus Solutions (formerly Cygnus Support)

==========================================

       CNS (our product based on Kerberos V4) all releases are not

       vulnerable.



       KerbNet Security System (our product based on Kerberos V5) all

       releases are not vulnerable.



  Since our version of rlogin is not installed set-user-id root, it is

  not vulnerable.  To secure a machine which is running our rlogin, all

  that is necessary is to secure the vendor rlogin.



Data General Corporation

========================



        The rlogin program included in DG/UX revisions prior to

        R4.12/R4.11MU03 do contain this vulnerability. This problem

        has been fixed in the rlogin program released with DG/UX

        revisions R4.12/R4.11MU03 and later.





Digital Equipment Corporation

=============================



        At the time of writing this document, patches(binary kits) are

        available from your normal Digital Support Channel.



        rlogin patches are available for:

            DIGITAL UNIX V3.2c, V3.2de1/de2, V3.2g, V3.2g, V4.0, V4.0a, V4.0b.

            DIGITAL ULTRIX V4.4 VAX & MIPS, V4.5 VAX and MIPS



                                DIGITAL EQUIPMENT CORPORATION

                                -----------------------------



FreeBSD, Inc.

=============

        This vulnerability is present in FreeBSD 2.1.5 and previous

        versions.  It was fixed in all FreeBSD source and

        binary distributions dated after 1996/07/25.



        The following source code patch may be applied to FreeBSD

        2.1.5 based distributions, and should work in previous

        distributions.  Users unable to apply this patch and

        recompile the rlogin binary are encouraged to use the

        wrapper provided by CERT.





Index: rlogin.c

===================================================================

RCS file: /home/ncvs/src/usr.bin/rlogin/rlogin.c,v

retrieving revision 1.5.4.1

retrieving revision 1.5.4.2

diff -c -r1.5.4.1 -r1.5.4.2

*** rlogin.c    1996/06/23 13:08:27     1.5.4.1

- --- rlogin.c    1996/07/25 18:29:35     1.5.4.2

***************

*** 102,107 ****

- --- 102,108 ----

  char *speeds[] = {

        "0", "50", "75", "110", "134", "150", "200", "300", "600", "1200",

        "1800", "2400", "4800", "9600", "19200", "38400", "57600", "115200"

+ #define       MAX_SPEED_LENGTH        (sizeof("115200") - 1)

  };



  #ifdef OLDSUN

***************

*** 259,265 ****

                exit(1);

        }



!       (void)strcpy(term, (p = getenv("TERM")) ? p : "network");

        if (ioctl(0, TIOCGETP, &ttyb) == 0) {

                (void)strcat(term, "/");

                (void)strcat(term, speeds[(int)ttyb.sg_ospeed]);

- --- 260,270 ----

                exit(1);

        }



! #define       MAX_TERM_LENGTH (sizeof(term) - 1 - MAX_SPEED_LENGTH - 1)

!

!       (void)strncpy(term, (p = getenv("TERM")) ? p : "network",

!                     MAX_TERM_LENGTH);

!       term[MAX_TERM_LENGTH] = '\0';

        if (ioctl(0, TIOCGETP, &ttyb) == 0) {

                (void)strcat(term, "/");

                (void)strcat(term, speeds[(int)ttyb.sg_ospeed]);





Hewlett-Packard Corporation

===========================



For updated information, please refer to the Hewlett-Packard Security

Bulletin "Security Vulnerability with rlogin," Document ID:

HPSBUX9707-066.



Use your browser to get to the HP Electronic Support Center page at:



      http://us-support.external.hp.com

      (for US, Canada, Asia-Pacific, & Latin-America)



      http://europe-support.external.hp.com

      (for Europe)



      Click on the Technical Knowledge Database, register as a user

      (remember to save the User ID assigned to you, and your password),

      and it will connect to a HP Search Technical Knowledge DB page.

      Near the bottom is a hyperlink to our Security Bulletin archive.

      Once in the archive there is another link to our current

      security patch matrix. Updated daily, this matrix is categorized

      by platform/OS release, and by bulletin topic.





IBM Corporation

===============

  See the appropriate release below to determine your action.





  AIX 3.2

  -------

    Apply the following fix to your system:



       APAR - IX57724 (PTF - U442613)



    To determine if you have this PTF on your system, run the following

    command:



       lslpp -lB U442613





  AIX 4.1

  -------

    Apply the following fix to your system:



        APAR - IX57972



    To determine if you have this APAR on your system, run the following

    command:



       instfix -ik IX57972



    Or run the following command:



       lslpp -h bos.net.tcp.client



    Your version of bos.net.tcp.client should be 4.1.4.13 or later.





  AIX 4.2

  -------

    No APAR required.  Fix already contained in the release.





  To Order

  --------

    APARs may be ordered using Electronic Fix Distribution (via FixDist)

    or from the IBM Support Center.  For more information on FixDist,

    reference URL:



       http://service.software.ibm.com/aixsupport/



    or send e-mail to aixserv@austin.ibm.com with a subject of "FixDist".





  IBM and AIX are registered trademarks of International Business Machines

  Corporation.





Linux Systems

=============

        Only very out of date Linux systems are vulnerable.



        Linux Netkit 0.08 has rlogin fixed. All Linux systems using older

        NetKits should upgrade to NetKit 0.09. Some vendors have shipped

        patched Netkit-0.08 releases. Check with your vendor for

        confirmation.



        NetKit 0.09 is available from:



        http://ftp.uk.linux.org/pub/linux/Networking/base/NetKit-0.09.tar.gz





NCR Corporation

===============



   NCR is delivering a set of operating system dependent patches which

   contain an update for this problem .  Accompanying each patch is a

   README file which discusses the general purpose of the patch and

   describes how to apply it to your system.



   Recommended solution:



   Apply one of the following patches depending on the revision of the

   inet package installed on your system. To check its version execute:



           pkginfo -x inet



   For inet 5.01: - PINET501 (Version 5.01.01.25)



   For inet 6.01: - PINET610 (Version 6.01.00.17)



   For inet 6.02: - Fix included.





NEC Corporation

===============

        UX/4800             Not vulnerable for all versions.

        EWS-UX/V(Rel4.2MP)  Not vulnerable for all versions.

        EWS-UX/V(Rel4.2)    Not vulnerable for all versions.

        UP-UX/V(Rel4.2MP)   Not vulnerable for all versions.





NetBSD

======

   This was fixed in NetBSD some time ago, and is part of the 1.2 release.



   NetBSD 1.1 and prior are vulnerable to this, and the best solution is to

   upgrade, or at least obtain new src/usr.bin/rlogin source and recompile.





NeXT Software, Inc.

===================

   This problem is fixed in OpenStep/Mach release 4.1 and later.





The Open Group

==============

    This problem was fixed in OSF's OSF/1 R1.3.3 maintenance release.





The Santa Cruz Operation (SCO)

==============================

     SCO is investigating this problem and should a patch be necessary, SCO

     will provide updated information for this advisory. Patches for SCO

     products are listed at http://ftp.sco.COM/SLS/README.



Sun Microsystems, Inc.

======================

 The vulnerability in rlogin is fixed by the following patches:



    OS version          Patch ID

    __________          ________

    SunOS 5.5.1         104650-02

    SunOS 5.5.1_x86     104651-02

    SunOS 5.5           104669-02

    SunOS 5.5_x86       104670-02

    SunOS 5.4           105254-01

    SunOS 5.4_x86       105255-01

    SunOS 5.3           105253-01

    SunOS 4.1.4         105260-01

    SunOS 4.1.3_U1      105259-01



- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------

The CERT Coordination Center staff thanks AUSCERT and DFN-CERT for their

contributions to the development of this advisory.

- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------



If you believe that your system has been compromised, contact the CERT

Coordination Center or your representative in the Forum of Incident Response

and Security Teams (see http://info.cert.org/pub/FIRST/first-contacts).





CERT/CC Contact Information

- ----------------------------

Email    cert@cert.org



Phone    +1 412-268-7090 (24-hour hotline)

                CERT personnel answer 8:30-5:00 p.m. EST(GMT-5) / EDT(GMT-4)

                and are on call for emergencies during other hours.



Fax      +1 412-268-6989



Postal address

         CERT Coordination Center

         Software Engineering Institute

         Carnegie Mellon University

         Pittsburgh PA 15213-3890

         USA



Using encryption

   We strongly urge you to encrypt sensitive information sent by email. We can

   support a shared DES key or PGP. Contact the CERT/CC for more information.

   Location of CERT PGP key

         http://info.cert.org/pub/CERT_PGP.key



Getting security information

   CERT publications and other security information are available from

        http://www.cert.org/

        http://info.cert.org/pub/



   CERT advisories and bulletins are also posted on the USENET newsgroup

        comp.security.announce



   To be added to our mailing list for advisories and bulletins, send your

   email address to

        cert-advisory-request@cert.org

   In the subject line, type

        SUBSCRIBE  your-email-address



- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------



Copyright 1997 Carnegie Mellon University. Conditions for use, disclaimers,

and sponsorship information can be found in

http://www.cert.org/legal_stuff.html and http://ftp.cert.org/pub/legal_stuff .

If you do not have FTP or web access, send mail to cert@cert.org with

"copyright" in the subject line.



CERT is registered in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.



- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------



This file: http://info.cert.org/pub/cert_advisories/CA-97.06.rlogin-term

           http://www.cert.org

               click on "CERT Advisories"





~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Revision history



Feb. 12, 1998  Added vendor information for NCR Corporation

Nov. 14, 1997  Added vendor information for Data General Corporation.

Oct. 30, 1997  Updated vendor information for Sun.

Sep. 26, 1997  Updated copyright statement

July 28, 1997  Appendix A - updated Hewlett-Packard information.

Feb. 11, 1997  Appendix A - added entries for Cygnus Solutions, NetBSD, and

                Sun Microsystems.











-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----

Version: PGP for Personal Privacy 5.0

Charset: noconv



iQA/AwUBOBS/T1r9kb5qlZHQEQJKWwCgzNMxL6IXQiTOD5etKK7grKzdL1AAoPPH

OB59g661D+fqYCJVWEqkAdLB

=IQWe

-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----