||Home : Advisories : Windows NetBIOS Unsolicited Cache Corruption|
||Windows NetBIOS Unsolicited Cache Corruption
||29th August 2000
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Network Associates, Inc.
COVERT Labs Security Advisory
August 29, 2000
Windows NetBIOS Unsolicited Cache Corruption
The Microsoft Windows implementation of the NetBIOS cache allows a
remote attacker to insert and flush dynamic cache entries as well as
overwrite static entries through unsolicited unicast or broadcast UDP
datagrams. As a result, remote attackers either on the local subnet
or across the Internet may subvert the NetBIOS Name to IP address
resolution process by redirecting any NetBIOS Name to any arbitrary
IP address under the control of the attacker.
Note: According to Microsoft, there will not be a patch released
for this vulnerability. The resolution section of this advisory
lists several options for end users to minimize its impact.
RISK FACTOR: HIGH
o Vulnerable Systems
All versions of Microsoft Windows 95, 98, NT and 2000 are susceptible
to cache corruption.
o Vulnerability Overview
The NetBIOS Name resolution process resolves NetBIOS Names into IP
addresses for many operations, including session establishment.
RFC 1001 (15.1.8) suggests that "an end-node may maintain a local
cache of NetBIOS name to IP address translation entries". This
NetBIOS cache is examined before queries are passed to support
services. The current contents can be examined via "nbtstat -c".
The CIFS family of protocols includes a browsing protocol that allows
for the dynamic discovery of servers running particular services.
The CIFS Browsing protocol supplies a dynamically generated Browse
List of network resources. The Network Neighborhood in Windows NT
4 and My Network Places in Windows 2000 provide a basic interface
to some of the information provided in a Browse List.
Interactions between Microsoft's implementation of NetBIOS and the
CIFS Browsing Protocols have created vulnerabilities allowing a
remote attacker either on a local subnet or across the internet to
subvert the NetBIOS Name resolution process.
o Vulnerability Information
The Microsoft designed CIFS Browser Protocol defines a number of
Browse Frames encapsulated within a NetBIOS datagram which is
defined in RFC 1002 (4.4). The NetBIOS datagram header contains a
source and destination NetBIOS name, as well as a second source IP
address, in addition to the IP headers.
When a Browse Frame Request is received on UDP port 138, Microsoft's
implementation extracts information from the NetBIOS datagram header
and stores the information in the NetBIOS cache. The source NetBIOS
Name and source IP address from the NetBIOS datagram header are
blindly extracted from the UDP datagram and inserted into the NetBIOS
As an interesting side note, when a Browse Frame Response is
generated the NetBIOS cache is examined to resolve the source NetBIOS
name of the previous request and delivered to that IP address.
Because the NetBIOS cache entry for the source NetBIOS name is under
control of the attacker, the response can be delivered to an
It is important to note that dynamic NetBIOS cache entries can be
inserted in addition to overwriting static entries imported from the
LMHOSTS file. Furthermore, the NetBIOS cache is corrupted with an
unsolicited UDP datagram, removing the requirement for attackers to
predict Transaction IDs. With the NetBIOS cache under the control
of a remote attacker many opportunities are available, one of the
most obvious is to subvert outbound SMB connections to an arbitrary
address. A rogue SMB server would then be able to capture NT
username and password hashes as presented.
In addition to inserting entries into the NetBIOS cache it is also
possible to flush dynamic entries. RFC 1001 (15.1.8) states that
"a node ought to flush any cache information associated with an IP
address if the node receives any information indicating that there
may be any possibility of trouble with the node at that IP address".
One possible way to flush dynamic NetBIOS cache entries is to
deliver an unsolicited Positive Name Query response that provides
a different IP address to NetBIOS name mapping to the entry in the
In a manner similar to DNS, the NetBIOS name resolution process
utilizes a 16-bit Transaction ID to associate requests and
responses. The Microsoft implementation of NetBIOS contains an
easily predictable Transaction ID, although the previously discussed
vulnerability is a much more effective method of inserting entries
into the NetBIOS cache.
COVERT Labs have worked with Microsoft in accordance with Microsoft's
Security Policies in an attempt to provide customers with a patch to
eliminate this vulnerability. Despite our best efforts and extensive
discussions, Microsoft believes that this issue is a result of the
unauthenticated nature of the NetBIOS protocol and will not be
providing a security patch.
To work around the NetBIOS cache corruption security vulnerability
there are a number of potential solutions. The most effective is to
upgrade to Windows 2000 and "Disable NetBIOS over TCP/IP". Obviously,
this is an impractical solution for many organizations. Some other
potential solutions include:
o Block ports 135-139 and 445, both UDP and TCP, at your network
perimeter to protect from external attackers.
o Because NetBIOS name resolution (either through broadcast or WINS)
is subject to this cache corruption attack, it should not be
relied upon to perform hostname to IP address resolution.
o Disable the "WINS Client" binding including the NetBIOS Interface,
Server and Workstation services. It is important to disable all
services that register a NetBIOS name as shown by nbtstat -n.
Selectively unbinding the "NetBIOS interface" or other specific
services such as Server or Workstation will still allow attackers
to talk to a NetBIOS name and corrupt the NetBIOS cache.
o It is important to note the Computer Browser Service is
independent of Browse Frame processing and generation (at least
within the bounds of this vulnerability). Disabling the service
has no impact upon this vulnerability.
The discovery and documentation of this vulnerability was conducted
by Anthony Osborne at the COVERT Labs of PGP Security.
o Contact Information
For more information about the COVERT Labs at PGP Security, visit our
website at http://www.pgp.com/covert or send e-mail to email@example.com
o Legal Notice
The information contained within this advisory is Copyright (C) 2000
Networks Associates Technology Inc. It may be redistributed provided
that no fee is charged for distribution and that the advisory is not
modified in any way.
Network Associates and PGP are registered Trademarks of Network
Associates, Inc. and/or its affiliated companies in the United States
and/or other Countries. All other registered and unregistered
trademarks in this document are the sole property of their respective
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