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Home : Advisories : PalmOS Password Retrieval and Decoding

Title: PalmOS Password Retrieval and Decoding
Released by: @stake
Date: 26th September 2000
Printable version: Click here

Hash: SHA1

                              @stake, Inc.


                          Security Advisory

Advisory Name: PalmOS Password Retrieval and Decoding (A092600-1)

 Release Date: 09/26/2000

  Application: PalmOS 3.5.2 and below

     Platform: All PalmOS Platform Devices

     Severity: Moderate. Passwords can easily be obtained

               and decoded allowing an attacker to access

               all private records on a Palm device.

       Author: Kingpin [kingpin@atstake.com]

 Contributors: DilDog [dildog@atstake.com]

Vendor Status: Vendor Response Included

          Web: www.atstake.com/research/advisories/2000/a092600-1.txt

Executive Summary:

    PalmOS offers a built-in Security application which is used for the

legitimate user to protect and hide records from unauthorized users by

means of a password. In all basic built-in applications (Address, Date

Book, Memo Pad, and To Do List), individual records can be marked as

"Private" and will only be accessible if the correct password is entered.

    It is possible to obtain an encoded form of the password, determine

the actual password due to a weak, reversable encoding scheme, and access

a users private data. In order for this attack to be successful, the

attacker must have physical access to the target Palm device.

    The threat of physical attacks internal to a company is very real and

this advisory makes the point that security is not limited to the

network/internet arena. The private records often contain passwords,

financial data, and company confidential information. Our experience with

physical audits has revealed that most users of Palm or other portable

devices do not realize that their private information could possibly be

accessed by unauthorized users.


    During the HotSync process, the Palm device sends an encoded form of

the password over the serial, IR, or network ports to the HotSync Manager

or HotSync Network Server on the desktop. The password is transmitted to

enable the Palm Desktop program to protect the users private records when

being accessed on the desktop machine. However, based on an encoding

scheme of XOR'ing against a constant block of data, the encoded password

is easily decoded into the actual ASCII version of the password. The

encoded block is also stored on the Palm device in the Unsaved Preferences

database, readable by any application on the Palm device.

    The transfer of a secret component (i.e. password), even if it is

encoded or obfuscated, over accessible buses (serial, IR, or network) is a

very risky design decision and is oftentimes considered a design flaw. It

is unfortunately common practice that applications choose to simply

obfuscate passwords instead of using encryption. Without proper encryption

methodologies in place, the task of determining the secret data is greatly

simplified as shown in this research.

    This advisory is an attempt to remind users and developers of the

common problem of storing secrets and the reliance on simple obfuscation.

Detailed Description:

    The password is set by the legitimate user with the Security

application. The maximum length of the ASCII password is 31 characters.

Regardless of the length of the ASCII password, the resultant encoded

block is always 32 bytes.

    It is possible to obtain the encoded password block in a number of


    () Retrieve from the "Unsaved Preferences" database on the Palm


    () Monitor the serial or network traffic during an actual HotSync.

    () Imitate the initial HotSync negotiation sequence in order to obtain

       the password (which is transmitted by the target device). This is

       demonstrated in our proof-of-concept tool written for the PalmOS


    The Palm desktop software makes use of the Serial Link Protocol (SLP)

to transfer information between itself and the Palm device. Each SLP

packet consists of a packet header, client data of variable size, and a

packet footer [Palm OS Programmer's Companion, pg. 255]. During the

HotSync negotiation process, one particular SLP packet's client data

consists of a structure which contains the encoded password block (Figure


    struct {

      UInt8 header[4];

      UInt8 exec_buf[6];

      Int32 userID; // 0

      Int32 viewerID; // 4

      Int32 lastSyncPC; // 8

      UInt8 successfulSyncDate[8]; // 12, time_t

      UInt8 lastSyncDate[8]; // 20, time_t

      UInt8 userLen; // 28

      UInt8 passwordLen; // 29

      UInt8 username[128]; // 30 -> userLen

      UInt8 password[128];


    Figure 1: Structure sent during the HotSync process which contains the

    encoded password block.

    Two methods are used to encode the ASCII password depending on its

length. For passwords of 4 characters or less, an index is calculated

based on the length of the password and the string is XOR'ed against a

32-byte constant block. For passwords greater than 4 characters, the

string is padded to 32 bytes and run through four rounds of a function

which XOR's against a 64-byte constant block. It is unknown why disparate

methods were implemented. By understanding the encoding schema used, it is

possible to essentially run the routines in reverse to decode the

password, as shown in our proof-of-concept tools. Details of each method

are described below.

    Neither encoding schema make use of the username, user ID, or unique

serial number of the Palm device. A common practice often used for

copy-protection purposes is to use a unique identifier as input into an

encoding or encryption algorithm, which PalmOS does not do. The resultant

encoded password block is completely independent of the Palm device used

and makes it easier to determine the original ASCII password from the


Passwords of 4 characters or less:

    By comparing the encoded password blocks of various short length

passwords (Figure 2), it was determined that a 32-byte constant (Figure 3)

was being XOR'ed against the ASCII password in the following fashion:

    56 8C D2 3E 99 4B 0F 88 09 02 13 45 07 04 13 44

    0C 08 13 5A 32 15 13 5D D2 17 EA D3 B5 DF 55 63

    Figure 2: Encoded password block of ASCII password 'test'

    09 02 13 45 07 04 13 44 0C 08 13 5A 32 15 13 5D

    D2 17 EA D3 B5 DF 55 63 22 E9 A1 4A 99 4B 0F 88

    Figure 3: 32-byte constant block for use with passwords of length 4

    characters or less

    Let A_j be the jth byte of A, the ASCII password

    Let B_k be the kth byte of B, the 32-byte constant block

    Let C_m be the mth byte of C, the encoded password block

    The starting index, i, into the constant block where the XOR'ing

should begin is calculated by the following:

    i = (A_0 + strlen(A)) % 32d;

    The encoded password block is then created:

         C_0 = A_0 XOR B_i

         C_1 = A_1 XOR B_i+1

         C_2 = A_2 XOR B_i+2

         C_3 = A_3 XOR B_i+3

         C_4 = B_i+4




        C_31 = B_i+31 (wrapping around to the beginning of the constant

                      block if necessary)

Example:  0x56 = 0x74 ('t') XOR 0x22

          0x8C = 0x65 ('e') XOR 0xE9

          0xD2 = 0x73 ('s') XOR 0xA1

          0x3E = 0x74 ('t') XOR 0x4A

Passwords greater than 4 characters:

    The encoding scheme for long length passwords (up to 31 characters in

length) is more complicated than for short length passwords, although it,

too, is reversable.

    First, the ASCII string is padded to 32 bytes in the following


    Let A_j be the jth byte of A, the ASCII password

    len = strlen(A);

    while (len < 32)


       for (i = len; i < len * 2; ++i)

          pass[i] = pass[i - len] + len; // increment each character by


       len = len * 2;


Example:  A_0 = 0x74 ('t')

          A_1 = 0x65 ('e')

          A_2 = 0x73 ('s')

          A_3 = 0x74 ('t')

          A_4 = 0x61 ('a')

          A_5 = 0x79

          A_6 = 0x6A

          A_7 = 0x78

          A_8 = 0x79

          A_9 = 0x66

         A_10 = 0x7E




    The resultant 32-byte array, A, is then passed through four rounds of

a function which XOR's against a 64-byte constant (Figure 4):

    B1 56 35 1A 9C 98 80 84 37 A7 3D 61 7F 2E E8 76

    2A F2 A5 84 07 C7 EC 27 6F 7D 04 CD 52 1E CD 5B

    B3 29 76 66 D9 5E 4B CA 63 72 6F D2 FD 25 E6 7B

    C5 66 B3 D3 45 9A AF DA 29 86 22 6E B8 03 62 BC

    Figure 4: 64-byte constant block for use with passwords greater than 4


    Let B_k be the kth byte of B, the 64-byte constant block

    Let m = 2, 16, 24, 8 for each of the four rounds

    index = (A_m + A_m+1) & 0x3F; // 6 LSB

    shift = (A_m+2 + A_m+3) & 0x7; // 3 LSB

    for (i = 0; i < 32; ++i)


      if (m == 32) m = 0; // wrap around to beginning

      if (index == 64) index = 0; // wrap around to beginning

      temp = B_index; // xy

      temp <<= 8;

      temp |= B_index; // xyxy

      temp >>= shift;

      A_m ^= (unsigned char) temp;




    The resultant 32-byte encoded password block (Figure 5) does not have

any remnants of the constant block as the short length encoding method

does.  Although the block appears to be "random", it is indeed reversable

with minimal computing resources as shown in our proof-of-concept tools.

    18 0A 43 3A 17 7D A3 CA D7 9D 75 D2 D3 C8 A5 CF

    F1 71 07 03 5A 52 4B B9 70 2D B2 D1 DF A5 54 07

    Figure 5: Encoded password block of ASCII password 'testa'

Temporary Solution:

The Security application provides functionality to "turn off and lock

device". If the Palm device is turned off and locked using this feature,

the device will not be operational until the correct password is entered.

This will prevent an unauthorized user from running applications on the

device (hence preventing them from starting the HotSync process). This

workaround is only useful if the legitimate user can be sure that the

attacker hasn't attained the system password already - simply change the

password to be sure. It may be possible to bypass the system lock-out

mechanism by entering into the PalmOS debug mode before the lock-out

features are called. This may allow an attacker to step over the security

code during a debugging session.

The use of third-party encryption solutions, such as Secure Memopad by

Certicom, which implement strong and tested cryptological algorithms to

protect the data of certain Palm applications.

Vendor Response:

Thanks you for your dilligence in testing our products thoroughly, we

appreciate your efforts.

We have taken a close look at your advisory in detail and while this is

certainly something we want to address for the future, we do not believe

this poses a major risk to all our users for the following reasons :- It

is not easy for someone to capture passwords accidentally, you need to

have access to the device and access to the OS/software as well to run the

hotsync and thence capture the data. It would also need to be a malicious,

funded, attack and some data points need to be known to the attacker,

making the chances of such an attack very low, but not impossible in

everyday life. However we do appreciate the risk involved if the attacker

is involved in some form of industrial espionage for example.

The simple way to protect against such an attack is to use products from

Force.com to keep the device about your person, or to use any of the

security programs such as OnlyMe or SignOn to secure access, (as

improvements over the supplied software security program) or data

encryption programs such as Jaws Technology encryptors, Securememopad from

Certicom to encrypt data, or Ntru encryption tools.

However we agree that any potential security issue needs to be taken

seriously and we have investigated this problem and expect to have both a

patch for older systems, and a solution for future releases of the PalmOS.

We respectfully ask you to post our response with your advisory, and thank

you for contributing to the secure future of Palm devices.


Palm Inc.

Proof-of-Concept Code:

    Proof-of-concept tools have been written for the Windows 9x/NT and

PalmOS 3.3 and greater platforms which demonstrate the simplicity of

obtaining the encoded password block from the target device and the weak

encoding scheme used to obfuscate the password. The PC version,

"PalmCrypt", will encode and decode ASCII passwords to encoded password

blocks and vice versa. The PalmOS version, "NotSync", will imitate the

initial stages of the HotSync process via the IR port, retrieve the

encoded password block of the target device, and decode and display the

resultant ASCII password.

    Source code and binaries for the proof-of-concept tools can be found




    Successfully using NotSync requires two Palm devices: One device

running the NotSync application and the other being the target device in

which the password is desired.

    Facing the two devices head-to-head, run the HotSync application on

the target Palm device and initiate an "IR to a PC/Handheld" HotSync.

NotSync, running on the other device, will obtain the legitimate user's

encoded password block, decode the password, and display the result on the


    Typical usage and output for PalmCrypt is shown below:

<--- cut here --->


PalmOS Password Codec


@stake Research Labs


August 2000

Usage: palmcrypt -[e | d] 

E:\>palmcrypt -e test

PalmOS Password Codec


@stake Research Labs


August 2000

0x56 0x8C 0xD2 0x3E 0x99 0x4B 0x0F 0x88  [V..>.K..]

0x09 0x02 0x13 0x45 0x07 0x04 0x13 0x44  [...E...D]

0x0C 0x08 0x13 0x5A 0x32 0x15 0x13 0x5D  [...Z2..]]

0xD2 0x17 0xEA 0xD3 0xB5 0xDF 0x55 0x63  [......Uc]

E:\>palmcrypt -d



PalmOS Password Codec


@stake Research Labs


August 2000

0x74 0x65 0x73 0x74                      [test    ]

<--- cut here --->

For more advisories: http://www.atstake.com/research/advisories/

PGP Key: http://www.atstake.com/research/pgp_key.asc

Copyright 2000 @stake, Inc. All rights reserved.


Version: PGP 6.5.8





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